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1962/10/23

Department of State INCOMING TELEGRAM 42-41 17489 Control: Action OCTOBER 24, 1962 Rec'd: TO 12:58 A.M. FROM: NEW YORK Info Secretary of State SS G NO: 1432, OCTOBER 23, MIDNIGHT SP L н CUBA - CORRIDOR REACTIONS SAT. ARA RAFAEL (ISRAEL) MADE STRONG PLEA FOR US NOT TO TAKE CUBAN AF CASE TO GA, SAYING HE CONVINCED IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US FIIR GET SUPPORT OF TWO-THIRDS. WHEN ASKED ABOUT HOW ISRAEL WOULD FE STAND. RAFAEL HINTED THIS WOULD DEPEND SOMEWHATON HOW AFRICANS NF A VOTED. Je DAC 2. NINCIC (YUGOSLAVIA) SAID HIS COUNTRY GRAVELY DISTURBED BY IOP DEVELOPMENTS. HE BLAMED US FOR ACTING TOO RAPIDLY WITHOUT INR CONFRONTING SECURITY COUNCIL AND WORLD OPINION WITH INFORMATION ABOUT RUSSIAN DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES WHICH DEPLOYMENT HE SAID RMR YUGOSLAVIA DEPLORES. KURAL (TURKEY) SAID HE VERY PLEASED WITH STRONG STAND US HAD TAKEN IN THIS MATTER BUT MADE PLEA FOR GREAT CARE IN HANDLING QUESTION IN GA LEST_TURKEY'S RIGHTS HAVE MISSILES SOMEHOW BE PUT IN JEOPARDY. 4. SEN. GORE BRIEFED CHARKRAVARTY (INDIA) IMMEDIATELY AFTER LATTER HAD HEARD STEVENSON SPEECH IN SC. SENATOR UNDERLINED GRAVITY OF THREAT TO US POSED BY SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF OFFENSIVE MISSILES, NECESSITY OF ACTING QUICKLY BEFORE FURTHER DELIVERIES COULD BE EFFECTED. CHAKRAVARTY DID NOT PROBE, BUT PROMISED TO PASS ON SENATOR'S POINTS TO HIS GOVT.

5. CONCENSUS NUMBER AFRICANS WE TALKED TO WAS THAT THEY

WOULD LIKE TO SEE MORE PROOF ON OUR PART THAT THESE ROCKETS IN CUBA REALLY THREATEN THE US.

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-2- 1432. OCTOBER 23, MIDNIGHT FROM NEW YORK

THEY ARE ALSO WONDERING WHY WE BLOCKADED FIRST AND WENT TO UN SECOND. HOWEVER, ONCE REASON IS EXPLAINED TO THEM, THEY TEND TO COME AROUND QUICKLY. AFRICANS APPARENTLY WANT TO BE HELP-FUL BUT HAVE CONFUSED IDEA AS TO WHAT WOULD BE HELPFUL SUCH AS PROPOSING WE PUT OFF APPLYING BLOCKADE UNTIL UN TEAM OF INSPECTORS CAN REACH CUBA; THAT WE OFFER TO DRAW BACK FROM OUR MOST ADVANCED BASES IF RUSSIANS WILL GET OUT OF CUBA; THAT WE AND RUSSIANS SIGN PLEDGE TO LIMIT CONFRONTATION TO "SHOOTING" RATHER THAN NUCLEAR WAR.

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6. JACOVIDES (CYPRUS) SAID HE NEVER HEARD OF "DOCTRINE OF QUARANTINE" IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. HE LATER EXPRESSED VIEW UNITED STATES LEGAL POSITION "HORRIBLY WEAK" IN CONTRAST "EXTREMELY STRONG POLITICAL POSITION."

aft.

7. MORRISSEY (IRELAND) ASSUMED US WOULD PASS OVER WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAIL LEGAL ASPECTS INVOLVED IN STOPPING OF SHIPS ...

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8. DIMITSAS (GREECE) VOICED FEAR SOVIETS MAKE COUNTER-MOVE IN GREECE, TURKEY OR IRAN.

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9. BERNARDIC (YUGOSLAYIA) ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO RUSSIAN SHIPS EN ROUTE TO CUBAR WE SAID, HOPEFULLY THEY WOULD TURN AROUND AND GO HOME BUT IF NOT MAYBE THERE WOULD BE SOME SHOOTING. HE SAID HE MUST GO AND TELL THE RUSSIANS.

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10. TABIBI (AFGHANISTAN) DEVELOPED SAME THEME. HE WAS CONCERNED SOVIETS WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO LOSE THAT MUCH FACE. WE POINTED OUT THAT THEY HAD THROWN DOWN THE GAUNTLET AND THAT. WE HAD NO RECOURSE BUT TO REACT STRONGLY, WHICH HAD BEEN EFFECTIVE BEFORE. WE HAD TO REACT WHEN IT WAS STILL POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO AVOID SHOOTING IF THEY WISHED. HE ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THEY REFUSED TO WITHDRAW UNILATERALLY AND ONLY AGREED TO DO SO OF WE DISMANTLED OUR BASES IN "TURKEY, IRAN AND PAKISTAN." WE RAN THROUGH GAMUT OF DIFFERENCES.

ONLY AGREED TO DO SO OF WE DISMANTLED OUR BASES IN "TURKEY, IRAN AND PAKISTAN." WE RAN THROUGH GAMUT OF DIFFERENCES, STRESSING NO US BASES IRAN AND PAKISTAN IN NORMAL SENSE THAT WORD.

STEVENSON

CT NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/SO, 10/24, TEM.